Saturday, 6 March 2021

WORLD- INEWS 1

WORLD-INEWS 1








Is



Protests



In



Russia



The



Beginning of



The End of



Putin?






8 March 2021







The September 6, 2019 issue of The Carnegie Europe "carnegieeurope.eu" published an article entitled "Young Russians Are Losing Trust in Putin’s Regime and Thinking of Leaving the Country" written by Gwendolyn Sasse and Felix Krawatzek.

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


Gwendolyn Sasse and Felix Krawatzek write:

"The recent protests have been called the beginning of the end of the Putin regime. Some observers even argue that it’s no longer the Kremlin that sets the political agenda but mass mobilisationinstead."

The authors address:

"The relationship between society and the political elites in Russia has been in flux over the last 12 months."

The writers explain:

"Protests have become more frequent and have spread beyond the big cities."

"However, most of these protests, such as those against the construction of a church in Yekaterinburg, a rubbish dump in Arkhangelsk, and other environmental protests, have been about specific local or social issues, rather than explicitly about political rights."

Sasse and Krawarzek point out:

"They are often framed as “apolitical” protests, and the diverse range of local participants may well perceive them as such for now."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


The authors address:

"Young people have been very visible among the protesters and Russia’s young generation was celebrated by some as turning against the authorities."

The writers explain:

"In an effort to understand how young Russians around the country feel about the country’s institutions, and who they trust, at the Berlin-based Centre for East European and International Studies we surveyed just over 2,000 young Russians aged 16-34 across the country’s 15 biggest cities in March 2018, shortly after the presidential elections. We then conducted a second identical survey in April 2019 as part of our ongoing research."

The writers note:

"The two online surveys were conducted on the basis of a sample with quotas for age, gender, and city of residence."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


Sasse and Krawatzek address:

"We found that between 50% and 60% of the respondents in both years “do not trust at all” or “rather do not trust” their mayor, the church, and state media."

The authors write:

"On the other hand, only between 30% and 40% “do not trust at all” or “rather do not trust” the president, the army, the security forces, and non-governmental organisations."

They address:

"This means a counter intuitive mixture of governmental and non-governmental organisations enjoyed the highest overall trust."

"However," the authors explain, "our initial comparison of the 2018 and 2019 data shows a statistically significant decrease in trust in the president, the army, security forces and the state media, whereas trust in voluntary organisations remained stable across the two years."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country






WHAT AFFECTS TRUST





Gwendolyn Sasse and Felix Krawatzek write:

"Higher education, gender, and international links – for example, if the respondents had family or friends abroad or personal experience of migration – are most consistently linked with low trust levels across the age group we surveyed."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


The authors explain:

"Men are significantly less likely than women to trust voluntary organisations, the security forces, the president, and the church."

The writers address:

"The more wealthy are more likely to trust the president, the local mayor, the security forces, the army, and the state-controlled media."

Sasse and Krawarzek write:

"People who regularly attend church naturally exhibit higher trust in the Russian Orthodox Church, but also in the president, the security forces, the state media, and the mayor of their city."

The authors point out:

"Four of the survey questions were directly related to protests, ranging from awareness about protests (about 60% across both years) and their legitimacy, to actual participation in environmental or social and political protests."

"But only when it came to the likelihood of actual participation in social and political protests did we find a statistically significant increase from one year to the next – from 4% in 2018 to 7% in 2019."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


Sasse and Krawatzek explain:

"More specifically, we found that men, those who self-identified as regular church attendees, and those with international links were more likely to have engaged in such protests."

The writers address:

"As these protests are mostly focused on local and social issues, that helps explains the significance of religion versus the irrelevance of factors such as education."

Sasse and Krawatzek state:

"We’re also finding that although participation in environmental protests didn’t increase significantly between 2018 and 2019, those respondents who regularly attend church and had international links were more likely to protest."

"But those who were more highly educated were not more likely to participate in a protest."

The authors add:

"Still, young people with higher education levels and personal international links were more likely to be aware of protests and think of them as legitimate forms of political participation."

The writers state:

"This points to the importance of access to information and social networks in influencing people’s views about protests."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country




THOUGHTS OF LEAVING




Gwendolyn Sasse and Felix Krawatzek write:

"Another way people voice their discontent with the current system is through migration, and our surveys also recorded a rise in the number of respondents contemplating emigration."

"While more than a third said they would prefer to go to another region of Russia, 23% said they would prefer an EU country, while 16% said the US or Canada."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


The authors address:

"Our survey is capturing a growing dissatisfaction among young Russians."
>
The writers point put:

"Within only one year, trust in key political institutions and state-controlled media declined and protest participation increased."

Sasse and Krawatzek write:

"While the recent protests in Moscow may well have reinforced this trend, our survey findings caution against assumptions or rthopes that mass mobilisation will be driven by Russia’s younger generation in the near future."

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country


The authors address:

"Those who protest still remain a minority."

"Migration, rather than protest," the writers explain, "appear to be the more likely response, even though many of those who currently contemplate migration will find that they lack the resources to choose this option."

Félix Krawatzek is a senior research fellow at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS).

Originally published: https://theconversation.com/young-russians-are-losing-trust-in-putins-regime-and-thinking-of-leaving-the-country-122747

September 6, 2019 6.56am EDT

 Gwendolyn Sasse,  Félix Krawatzek, University of Oxford

Source:

Young Russians
Are
Losing
Trust
in
Putin’s
Regime
and
Thinking
of
Leaving
the
Country








Did
Putin's
Man
in
Crimea
Have
Mafia
Ties?



January
27,
2018
Putin's
man
in
Crimea:
"We
have
returned
to
Russia
forever."



MARCH
10,
2014
Putin's
Man
in
Crimea
Is
Ukraine's
Worst
Nightmare








Respecting



Russia's




Legal



System



To



Legalize



Russia's



Aggressions?






8 March 2021







The 04 February issue of The Washington Post published a repot entitled "Lavrov to Blinken: Respect Russia’s legal system".

Source:

Lavrov
to
Blinken:
Respect

Russia’s
legal
system


Question:
Do President Vladimir Putin and his 2 cowboys (Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigo) respect the legal systems of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine?


Link:


Анастасия
Кириленко:
Tambovskaya
gang

calling:
How
mafia
keeps
in
touch
with
Putin's
entourage
(Intercepted
conversations)


03
May
2016:
Spain
hunts
'mafia-
linked'
Russians
including
state
officials



Viktor
Rezunkov,
Robert
Coalson
(21.12.2015):
"From
Communist
Gold
To
Kremlin
Power:
Spanish
Prosecutors
Outline
Russia’s
Captive
State"






Isn't



Putin's



Regime



Ready



To



Collapse?






8 March 2021








The Feb. 2, 2021 issue of The Washington Post published an article entitled "Navalny’s fiery indictment of the ‘small man in a bunker’ could rattle Putin’s autocracy" written as the opinion by Editorial Board.

The editorial board of the Washington Post write:

"The Putin regime is probably not at risk of collapse."

The members of the editorial board address:

"But its leader clearly fears the possibility of a “color revolution” like those that toppled autocratic and pro-Moscow regimes in Ukraine and Georgia."

The editorial board's members quote Alexei Navalny as saying:

"This is happening to intimidate large numbers of people.”

"They’re imprisoning one person to frighten millions.”

The edotorial board's members address:

"Most likely, it won’t work."

Source:

Navalny’s
fiery
indictment
of
the
‘small
man
a
bunker’
could
rattle
Putin’s
autocracy






Jun 19,
2020:
RUSSIAN
LAWFARE
AND
OTHER
MALIGN
INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS
IN
SPAIN



Анастасия
Кириленко
(16 ноября
2018):
Tambovskaya
gang
calling:
How
mafia
keeps
in
touch
with
Putin's
entourage
(Intercepted
conversations)



Russian
Mafia



By
Viktor Rezunkov,
Robert Coalson
(December
17,
2015)
From
Communist
Gold
To
Kremlin
Power:
Spanish
Prosecutors Outline
Russia's
Captive
State







Short Before November 10, 2021



Armenia



Launched



Russia's



Iskandar



Missiles



Into



The



Capital



of



Azerbaijan







March 8, 2022







The March 2, 2021 issue of The Moscow Times "moscowtimes.com" published an article entitled "Israeli Defense System Shot Down Russian Missile in Karabakh War – Reports" written by. Yuri Smityuk / TASS.

Yuri Smityuk writes:

"Azerbaijan had deployed an Israeli-made defense system to shoot down a Russian-made missile that Armenia launched in the closing days of last fall's war over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Middle East Eye news website reported Monday."

The author addresses:

"An unnamed official said Yerevan had launched a Russian Iskander missile “directly into the capital” of Azerbaijan days before signing a ceasefire with Baku in November, the outlet reported without indicating which country the official represented."

Source:

Yuri
Smityuk /
TASS
(March 2, 2021)
Israeli
Defense
System
Shot
Down
Russian
Missile
in
Karabakh
War

Reports


Mr. Smityuk points out:

“But a missile defense system operated by the Azerbaijani military, an Israeli-made Barak-8, shot it down,” the Middle East Eye quoted them as saying."

The author writes:

“I think, among other things, it convinced the Azerbaijani leadership to go for a ceasefire,” the source said, noting that “further use of these missiles could really escalate the situation on the ground.”"

The writer addresses:

"A Turkish military researcher interviewed by the outlet said Armenia resorted to Iskanders after Soviet-made Tochka and Scud missiles as it lost ground in the conflict."

“We believe that Russians played a role since the missile command center is jointly run by Armenian and Russian military officers,” said Can Kasapoglu, defense research director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

Source:

Yuri
Smityuk /
TASS
(March 2, 2021)
Israeli
Defense
System
Shot
Down
Russian
Missile
in
Karabakh
War

Reports






The October 9, 2020 issue of The Foreign Policy "foreignpolicy.com" published an article entitled "Without Russian Aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan Has the Upper Hand in Nagorno-Karabakh" written by Robert M Coulter.

Robert M Coulter writes:

The renewal of fighting in the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian forces could have been foretold."

Source:

Without
Russian
Aid
to
Armenia,
Azerbaijan
Has
the
Upper
Hand
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh


The author explains:

"A four-day outbreak of hostilities in mid-July occurred in northwest Azerbaijan, 60 miles away from Nagorno-Karabakh, but that is not even the proximate cause of today’s fighting."

The writer addresses:

"The current conflict broke out in the late 1980s, when Armenians in Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) began organizing to take the territory out of Azerbaijan.

Robert M. Coulter writes:

'When the NKAO Regional Council voted to unite with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in February 1988, central Soviet authorities abolished the local government and instituted direct rule from Moscow."

Source:

Without
Russian
Aid
to
Armenia,
Azerbaijan
Has
the
Upper
Hand
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh


The author addresses:

"In 1992, a year after the two countries became independent, Armenian forces seized control of the “Lachin corridor,” a winding mountain road since improved with funds from the Armenian diaspora, connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia."

"Turning northward," writes Mr. Coulter, "they then seized and held the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan."

The writer describes:

"They continued, until early last month, to hold not only the former NKAO but seven additional Azerbaijani districts outside the former NKAO, forming a bloc having a long common border with Armenia."

The author points out:

"For a quarter century, Azerbaijan has had to support a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons representing 10 percent of its total population."

According to him:

"That was the situation when the war ended in 1994."

Source:

Without
Russian
Aid
to
Armenia,
Azerbaijan
Has
the
Upper
Hand
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh


Robert M. Coulter explains:

"Despite periodic skirmishes, the worst of which were in 2016, the status quo remained—until last month. The whole area under occupation represents 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory."

He addresses:

"No fewer than four U.N. Security Council Resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) adopted in 1993 called for Armenian troops to leave all these occupied territories without delay."

Source:

Without
Russian
Aid
to
Armenia,
Azerbaijan
Has
the
Upper
Hand
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh





Links:


24 February
2021:
Alexander 's
creator
SPOKE:
Pashinyan
doesn't
know
what
he's
talking
about



24 February
2021:
Russia
will
bring
Pashkina
to
its
knees
-
A
DEMAND
WAS
SENT
TO
Yerevan



6 Nov
2020:
How
long
has
Vladimir
Putin
been
President
for?



Putin
will
stay
in
power
until
2036







If



"Stepanakert"



=



"Khankendi"



Becomes



A



De-Facto



Russian



Protectrate





Then, there is no legal mandate for Russian Peacekeeping contingent to take over governance of the Karabakh Armenian entity in international legal terms






08 March 2021








The 26 November 2020 issue of The Global Policy Journal "globalpolicyjournal.com" published an article entitled "The End of the “Nagorno-Karabakh” Region?" written by Farid Guliyev.

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


Farid Guliyev writes:

The new trilateral agreement spells the end of the “Nagorno-Karabakh” region as we know it."

The author explains:

"There is no empirical “Nagorno-Karabakh” anymore to match its oft-used geographic-political or – legal label. Ethnic Armenians will get the same cultural and linguistic rights as other minority groups in Azerbaijan."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


The writer addresses:

"A truce signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia on November 10 halted hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in and around the “Nagorno-Karabakh” region (thereafter NK), the label applied to a mountainous region of Azerbaijan with ethnic Armenian majority."

According to him:

"The recent flare-up that began on September 27 and lasted for six weeks followed almost three decades of futilOSCE-mediated negotiations."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


Farid Guliyev addresses:

"According to a new agreement, Azerbaijan cemented territorial gains in the four southern districts surrounding NK (Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangelan, Gubadli) as well as parts of the territory of mountainous Karabakh itself including Madagiz (renamed Sugovushan) in north-east, Hadrut in south-east and the cultural center of historic Karabakh – the hill-top town of Shusha."

The author explains:

"Armenia agreed to pull out of the three other districts of Kalbajar, Aghdam and Lachin (except for a 5-km Lachin corridor) and transfer these areas to Azerbaijan by December 1 this year."

"A Russian peacekeeping contingent deployedto the line of contact and along the Lachin corridor, and a new road is to be constructed to connect Khankendi/ Stepanakert with Armenia bypassing Shusha."

Mr. Guliyev writes:

"The Armenian military forces and hardware will be replaced with Russian peacekeepers."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


The author writes:

"Due to the border shifts, the concept of “Nagorno-Karabakh” becomes a passé, both physically and legally."

Mr. Guliyev addresses:

"The popularized view holds that majority Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh “was placed” within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan by Stalin is not only misleading but also historically inaccurate."

The writer explains:<

"In the early 1920s, Karabakh – a bigger territory than its “nagorno” (or mountainous) part – had an Azerbaijani majority population. Nagorno-Karabakh was artificially carved out to build an ethnic Armenian-majority “oblast”."

Mr. Farid Guliyev explains:

"The resolution of Kavbiuro (Caucasian Bureau) adopted on July 5, 1921 – the infamous “Stalin’s decision” (on which Stalin himself did not even vote) -- stated that due to economic ties between lowland and highland regions of historic Karabakh, “mountainous Karabakh is to remain within the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR” (see Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, 1992, p. 118)."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


The author points out:

"The decision to separate the mountainous part of Karabakh from its lowland parts to build an ethnic-Armenian dominated enclave within Azerbaijan was taken by Azerbaijani Communist Party’s leadership which at that time was dominated by ethnic Armenians and Russians."

Mr. Guliyev addresses:

"In 1922, the Azerbaijani Communist Party set up a commission to decide on the shape and status of what became known as “Nagorno-Karabakh” that did not include a single ethnic Azerbaijani representative."

The writer explains:

"That commission’s decision was to separate the mountainous portions of Karabakh into a separate administrative unit from the rest of the historic Karabakh area based on an ethnic principle, and thus “Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” [NKAO] was carved out of the territory of Azerbaijan."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


Farid Guilyev writes:

"The Armenian military defeat this time around reduces the territory of the former NKAO to a much smaller size, in fact to less than a third of the territory Armenian separatist authorities controlled before war broke out."

The author talks about the results of a big loss by Armenians:

'First, the territorial dimension."

"Territories that Armenia cedes to Azerbaijan following its military losses are considerable."

The writer states:

"Redrawn borders truncate the geographically expansive self-proclaimed “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR)”-- comprising NK plus seven adjacent districts – to just about 30 percent of its former size."

The author points out:

Second, militarily, the new borders not only shrink the territory of the former “NKR” but also isolates it from its immediate border with Armenia.

Mr. Guliyev addresses:

"After border adjustments, the ethnic Armenian-populated areas will be surrounded and placed much deeper inside Azerbaijani territory (and surrounded by a much stronger Azerbaijani military and also possibly Turkish military)."

"Smaller size also makes it harder for Armenian separatists to transfer and transport military hardware," adds the author.

According to him:

"By retaking the strategically located Shusha, Armenian separatists will be much more vulnerable to any attempts to revision the borders by military force."

Mr. Guliyev addresses:

"Shusha’s strategical location prevents any military build-up in Stepanakert, which is 10 kilometers away to the north."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


The writer talks about the future status of the so-called Armenian separatist entity with the following words:

"Finally, legally speaking, the agreement does not mention anything about the future status of the Armenian separatist entity, and Russian foreign minister Lavrov said that the status “has not been determined”".

The author adds:

"This means that UNSC resolutions – that confirm Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity – remain in force."


******



Mr. Guliyev addresses:

"President Putin himself recently stated that from the international law point of view, Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent districts are recognized as “an inalienable part of the Republic of Azerbaijan”".

The author notes:

"Local ethnic Armenians’ right to self-determination appears to be questionable as is any parallels with Kosovo."


******



The writer addresses:

If Stepanakert/Khankendi becomes a de facto Russian protectorate, as some experts argue, there is no legal mandate for Russian PC contingent – whose term is limited to 5 years with the possibility of extension -- to take over governance of the Karabakh Armenian entity in international legal terms."

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?


Farid Guliyev writes:

"The authority of the former separatist governor Arayik Harutyunyan had not been recognized before the war and leaves his future status unspecified."

The author explains:

All this leaves Baku the only legitimate and legal owner of Karabakh lands. Azerbaijan, in its turn, abolished the “autonomous oblast” status of NK in 1991, so technically NK ceased to exist 30 years ago."
The writer points out:

"Instead of a territorially delineated autonomy, ethnic Armenians will enjoy the same status and rights as other ethnic minority groups in Azerbaijan including the full range of cultural and linguistic rights."

Mr. Guliyev addresses:

"The range of such cultural rights might be expanded and cultural heritage sites need to be protected."


Farid Guliyev is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany.

Previously, he served as a visiting lecturer at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at ADA University in Baku, Azerbaijan.

In 2016-17, he was a Fulbright Scholar at the George Washington University, Washington, DC. The usual disclaimer applies.

Source:

The
End
of
the
“Nagorno
-Karabakh”
Region?




Armenia



Officially



Reachedout



To



Russia



For



Assistance







8 March 2021







The November 14, 2020 issue of The Diplomat "thediplomat.com" published an article entitled "Was the Nagorno-Karabakh Deal a Missed Opportunity for the CSTO?" written by Janko Šćepanović.

Janko Šćepanović writes:

"Nagorno-Karabakh is officially a part of Azerbaijan, whose territorial integrity was reaffirmed by U.N. Security Council resolutions, and even more resolutely supported by the U.N. General Assembly in 2008, which demanded a complete withdrawal of Armenian troops."

"However, since the ceasefire in 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh had functioned as a de facto sovereign entity."

Source:

Was
the
Nagorno
-Karabakh
Deal
a
Missed
Opportunity
for
the
CSTO?


The author addresses:

"Russia feels responsible for what it declared in 2008 as its “regions of privileged interests.”"

The writer points out:

"Furthermore, Armenia is Moscow’s close ally and a fellow member of both a militaryalliance, the Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO), and an economic bloc, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)."

Source:

Was
the
Nagorno
-Karabakh
Deal
a
Missed
Opportunity
for
the
CSTO?


Mr. Šćepanović writes:

"The two sides have close bilateral ties and an alliance that requires Moscow to come to Armenia’s aid should it need it."

The author addresses:

"Back in 1997, they signed a treaty of “friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance” which includes a provision for military assistance."

The writer states:

"Armenia officially reachedout to Russia for assistance and on October 31, the Russian foreign ministry reiterated Moscow’s preparedness to fulfill such commitments."

Source:

Was
the
Nagorno
-Karabakh
Deal
a
Missed
Opportunity
for
the
CSTO?


Mr. Šćepanović writes:

"Russia will deploy 1,960 service members from the 15th separate motorized rifle brigade with 90 armored personnel carriers and 380 other military units, which, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, had experience with supporting and protecting humanitarian operations in Syria."

The author explains:

"Their initial mandate will be for five years, and the parties provisionally agreed to prolong it for an additional five."

Source:

Was
the
Nagorno
-Karabakh
Deal
a
Missed
Opportunity
for
the
CSTO?


The writer points out:

"According to reports, the peacekeeping force will be deployed alongside the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh, although their tasks are yet to be specified."

Mr. Šćepanović writes:

"Moreover, Russia is able to place its military on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh, where it had been previously absent, and thus extend its regional clout."

Source:

Was
the
Nagorno
-Karabakh
Deal
a
Missed
Opportunity
for
the
CSTO?


The author addresses:

"Russia also saved face after an earlier October 10 ceasefire collapsed and bypassed the involvement of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, which seems to be in need of reform."

Janko Šćepanović, Ph.D., is a post-doctoral researcher at the School of Advanced International and Area Studies of East China Normal University (ECNU), in Shanghai, the People’s Republic of China.

Source:

Was
the
Nagorno
-Karabakh
Deal
a
Missed
Opportunity
for
the
CSTO?





Putin



Combines:



Military



Adventurism



And



Agression



Abroad




The US Committee

on Foreign Relations:

Putin has combined military adventurism and aggression abroad with propaganda and political repression at home








8 March 2021








A MINORITY


STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

One Hundred Fifteenth Congress Second Session January 10, 2018
Senate Prints 115-21] From the U.S. Government Publishing Office

115th Congress} { S. Prt. 2nd Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { 115-21








The Kremlin's



Paranoid Pathology






LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL



Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
addresses:




United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, January 10, 2018 Dear Colleagues:

For years, Vladimir Putin's government has engaged in a relentless assault to undermine democracy and the rule of law in Europe and the United States.

Mr. Putin's Kremlin employs an asymmetric arsenal that includes military invasions, cyberattacks, disinformation, support for fringe political groups, and the weaponization of energy resources, organized crime, and corruption.

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


The Kremlin has refined the use of these tools over time and these attacks have intensified in scale and complexity across Europe.

If the United States fails to work with urgency to address this complex and growing threat, the regime in Moscow will become further emboldened.

It will continue to develop and refine its arsenal to use on democracies around the world, including against U.S. elections in 2018 and 2020.

The threat posed by Mr. Putin's meddling existed before the current U.S. Administration, and may well extend beyond it.

Yet, as this report will demonstrate, the Russian government's malign influence operations can be deterred.

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


Several countries in Europe took notice of the Kremlin's efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. election and realized the danger posed to their democracies.

They have taken steps to build resilience against Mr. Putin's aggression and interference, and the range of effective measures implemented by European countries provide valuable lessons for the United States.

To that end, this report recommends a series of actions that the United States should take across government, civil society, and the private sector--and in cooperation with our allies--to push back against the Kremlin's aggression and establish a set of long-term norms that can neutralize such efforts to undermine democracy.

Yet it must be noted that without leadership from the President, any attempt to marshal such a response will be inherently weakened at the outset.

In addition, it is important to draw a distinction between Mr. Putin's corrupt regime and the people of Russia.

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


Many Russian citizens strive for a transparent, accountable government that operates under the democratic rule of law, and we hold hope for better relations in the future with a Russian government that reflects these demands.

In the meantime, the United States must work with our allies to build defenses against Mr. Putin's asymmetric arsenal, and strengthen international norms and values to deter such behavior by Russia or any other country.

By Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member .


Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE Washington 2017 28-110 PDF






PUTIN'S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE:


IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY




Executive Summary:




"Nearly 20 years ago, Vladimir Putin gained and solidified power by exploiting blackmail, fears of terrorism, and war."

"Since then, he has combined military adventurism and aggression abroad with propaganda and political repression at home, to persuade a domestic audience that he is restoring Russia to greatness and a respected position on the world stage."

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE Washington 2017 28-110 PDF


"All the while, he has empowered the state security services and employed them to consolidate his hold on the levers of political, social, and economic power, which he has used to make himself and a circle of loyalists extraordinarily wealthy."

"Democracies like the United States and those in Europe present three distinct challenges to Mr. Putin."

"First, the sanctions they have collectively placed on his regime for its illegal occupation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine threaten the ill-gotten wealth of his loyalists and hamper their extravagant lifestyles."

"Second, Mr. Putin sees successful democracies, especially those along Russia's periphery, as threats to his regime because they present an attractive alternative to his corrupt and criminal rule."

"Third, democracies with transparent governments, the rule of law, a free media, and engaged citizens are naturally more resilient to the spread of corruption beyond Russia's borders, thereby limiting the opportunities for the further enrichment of Putin and his chosen elite."

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


"Mr. Putin has thus made it a priority of his regime to attack the democracies of Europe and the United States and undermine the transatlantic alliance upon which Europe's peace and prosperity have depended upon for over 70 years."

"He has used the security services, the media, public and private companies, organized criminal groups, and social and religious organizations to spread malicious disinformation, interfere in elections, fuel corruption, threaten energy security, and more."

"At their most extreme, the Russian government's security services have been used to harass and even assassinate political enemies at home and abroad;

cheat at the Olympic Games; and protect and exploit cybercriminals in Russia who attack American businesses and steal the financial information of American consumers.

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


"Mr. Putin resorts to the use of these asymmetric tools to achieve his goals because he is operating from a position of weakness--hobbled by a faltering economy, a substandard military, and few followers on the world stage."

"While consolidating his grip on power at home, Mr. Putin oversaw an opportunistic expansion of malign influence operations abroad, targeting vulnerable states on Russia's periphery, as well as countries in Western institutions like the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)."

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


"The Kremlin has substantially increased its investments in propaganda outlets beyond Russia's borders, funded and supported nongovernmental organizations and political parties that advanced Mr. Putin's anti-EU and anti- NATO agenda, nationalized mafia groups to help launder money and commit other crimes for the state abroad, and used its near-monopoly over energy supplies in some countries to exert influence and spread corruption."

"In semi-consolidated democracies and transitional governments on Russia's periphery,the Kremlin most aggressively targets states that seek to integrate with the EU and NATO or present an opportunity to weaken those institutions from within."

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY


"For example, as Georgia and Ukraine moved closer to these institutions, the Russian government attacked them with cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, and military force."

"When the Kremlin's attempt to politically influence Montenegro's election failed, its security services allegedly tried to launch a coup."

"In Serbia, the Kremlin exploits cultural connections and leverages its near monopoly on energy supplies to attempt to slow down or derail the country's Western integration efforts."

"And though they are in the EU and NATO, countries like Hungary and Bulgaria face acute challenges from the Russian government, which exerts significant influence in politics, business, and the energy sector."

Source:

Senator
Benjamin L.
Cardin
(2028):
PUTIN'S
ASYMMETRIC
ASSAULT
ON
DEMOCRACY
IN
RUSSIA
AND
EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY







Debbie
White,
Sofia
Petkar
(Nov 6,
2020):
How
long
has
Vladimir
Putin
been
President for?



February
24,
2021
-Pashkina's
remarks
about
"Alexander"
caused
a
"storm"
in
Russia



24
February
2021:
"Russia
will
bring
Pashkina
to
its
knees
-
A
DEMAND
WAS
SENT
TO
Yerevan"







Moscow's



Plans



In



South Caucsaus



Dividing



And



Keeping



Hegemony






The Nov 11, 2020 issue of the New Atlanticist "atlanticcouncil.org" published an article entitled "Putin’s Karabakh victory sparks alarm in Ukraine" written by Anders Åslund.

Source:

Putin’s
Karabakh
victory
sparks
alarm
in
Ukraine


Anders Åslund writes:

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have achieved a significant victory this week in Nagorno-Karabakh that threatens to alter the geopolitical balance throughout the former Soviet space in his favor."

The author addresses:

"By brokering a Kremlin-friendly peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Putin has succeeded in considerably expanding Russia’s military presence in the strategically important Southern Caucasus region."

The writer explains:

"Crucially, he has done so without encountering any Western pushback."

According to the author:

"This unchecked advance should set alarm bells ringing in other ex-Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova."
Source:

Putin’s
Karabakh
victory
sparks
alarm
in
Ukraine



The February 11, 2020 issue of Tge Carnegie Europe "carnegieeurop.eu" published an article entitled "Unfinished Business in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict" written by Thomas De Waal.

Source:

Unfinished
Business
in
the
Armenia-
Azerbaijan
Conflict


Thomas De Waal writes:

"The November trilateral agreement radically changes the geopolitical configuration of the region, giving Moscow a central role it last held in the Soviet era three decades ago."

Russia's military hegemony in the South Caucasus has been well established for more than 200 years.

The Russian yoke comes when the the Russia's hegemony enters into the lives of millions of peoples living in the South Caucasus.

Keeping dividing the nations in the South Caucasus has been the agenda of the Russia's rulers.

Stopping dividing?

The Russia's rulers resist to stop dividing between nations because stopping means the end of the Russia's hegemony.

Russia's hegemony depends not only on the investment on the weaponary but also in its constant efforts to divide different nations in the South Caucasus and elsewhere.

Russia's imperialism is alive because of its imperial agenda."

Dividing the nations, creating tensions and making wars have been as the blood in the blood vessels of the Russia's imperialism.

By making the borders conflicts Russia makes its geopitical wins.

Conflicts and wars are the cornerstones of the Russia's doctrine in the South Caucasus.

Vladimir Putin criticizes Stalin in some cases but he follows Stalin's steps in dividing of the nations in the South Caucasus region.

Dividing the nations keeps the Russia's hegemony alive.

When Vladimir Putin says that the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union as a greatest tragedy of the 20th century, he means it.

Putin's cowboys in the Kremlin are doing their best efforts to humilate and to bring back the former Soviet republics again under the yoke of the Russia's imperialism.

Peace for Russia means making many pieces from the territories of the former Soviet republics either in the South Caucasus or in Europe or in the central Asia.

Peace for Vladimir Putin and his cowboys (Sergey Lavrov, Sergei Shoigo):

It means making a lot of pieces from the territories of the former Soviet republics and then incorporating these pieces to Russia.

But peace in its real meaning is :"Russia out of the South Caucasus forever".

Russia wants the continuation of its tyranny.

Russia wanrs to keep the divisions in the borders of the former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus alive.

Tensions and wars are good for the military hegemony of Russia.

Russia can deploy the Russian troops there and no country in the world can protest!

Russia can invade the countries and then it can claim its troops are the peacekeeping troops.

The US, the European countries keep silence!

Russia uses a fake name for its invaders as the Russian peacekeeping contingent.

Mr. Putin's nine-point agreement of November 9–10 was illegal becsuse it ignored the will of people and their parliaments.

Mr. Putin's nine-point agreement of November 9–10 was illegal because it was only a dictat from a dictator in the Kremlin whom were assisted his 2 cownoys,namely, Sergei Lavrov and Sergey Shoigo et al.

Mr. Putin's nine-point agreement of November 9–10 was illegal because it was not only a dictat but also it was charlatanism.

This nine-point fake agreement of November 9–10 deserves a Nobel Prize for Mr. Putin's charlatanism.

This "nine-point declaration" arranged by Vladimir Putin's imperial visions for the geopolitical gains in the South Caucasus need the signatures from the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Putin like a tzar ordered to the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia ti sign his nine-point declaration.

The fearful leaders signed the "nine-point declaration" as Putin ordered them to do it.

Putin himself tasted his own cooking soup! and he signed it.

Putin was the cook of this "nine-point declaration" (charlatanism) following the fall of Shusha city on 8 Nov 2020.

Vladimir Putin wanted to rescue its ally Armenia from total collapse.

Putin forced the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign his forced agreement [at midnight in Moscow] while peoples in Armenia and Azerbaijan were sleeping. It was around 1 a.m.!!

Why Mr. Putin should force the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign his DIKTAT "nine-point declaration" after midnight around 1 or 2 a.m. ?

Are Mr. Putin and his cowboys crazy?

After midnight the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan must agree to Mr. Putin's order [who prevented by this order to liberate over 4,000 kiloneres of the Azerbaijani territories] to stop from fighting.

Putin didn't want Azerbaijan to liberate the rest of its territiries from the occupation (Russians and Armenians).

It was a matter of hours to liberate the whole occupied territories.

Therefore, Putin and his Armenian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (Sergei Kalantarian) inteevened and prevented the liberation of 4,000 sqare km of the Azerbaijani territories.

Putin and his cowboys in the Kremlin hurried after midnight to stop Azerbaijani army from liberating the rest of the occupied territories.

Azerbaijani people always see the Russian soldiers as the occupant.

The Azerbaijani people see the Russian troops as those troops who had massacred many ofntheir brothers and sisters either in the Khojali genocide (26 Feb 1992) or in the Baku massacre in 20th January 1990.

Russia's mission in the South Caucasus is the spreading conflicts.

Russia spreads the seeds of the future conflicts and wars.

By doing si, Russia keeps its hegemony in the region alive.

Russia is the engine motor for the proxy wars against Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus.

Russia is responsible for killings of many thousands of Azerbaijani people.

In the past Russia initiated wars and conflics against Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus.

The real occupant and war maker in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan was Russia.

Today, Russia is again the occupying imperial power in the Karabakh of Azerbaijan.

Russia can never be as a mediator or as a peace keeper.

How can you invite a murder to be as a mediator of his crimes?

Russia is not intetested to peace in this region.
Peace means NO RUSSIA! Peace means no Russian troops!
Russia want to dominate forever in the South Caucasus.

Russia wants hegemony and imperial power to shape its imperial intetests.

The political experts in Azerbaijan and elswhere wonder whether in five years [the time in which Russia buys time to deceive the world] can Azerbaijan unilaterally denounce Russia’s presence in its 4,000 sqare km in and hence to finish its unfinished liberation mission.

Wherever the Russian troops go [without the UN mandate] these troops will stay there for a long time.

They make there as the Russia's military base.



Nataliia
Popovych
and
Danylo
Lubkivsky
(MON, JUL 6,
2020):
Czar
Putin
wants
a
new
age of
empires


February 24,
2021:
Pashkina's
remarks
about
"Alexander "
caused
a
"storm"
in
Russia


On 23 Feb 2021 The Aljazeera "aljazeera.com" published a report entitled "Armenia protests: PM Pashinyan faces fresh calls to quit."

Source:

Armenia
protests:
PM
Pashinyan
faces
fresh
calls
to
quit


Aljazeera News Agency repprts:

"...Russia also has a fully-fledged military base manned by some 3,000 troops in the Armenian city of Gyumri, near the Turkish border, under a formal defence pact with Armenia."

The Aljazeera quotes from Mr. Harutyuonyan, the defense minister of Armenia, as saying to Russia’s RIA news agency:

"The question of expanding and bolstering the Russian military base on the territory of Armenia has always been on the agenda.”
“The Armenian side has always been interested in this.”

Source:

Armenia
protests:
PM
Pashinyan
faces
fresh
calls
to
quit


The Aljazeera addresses:

"Harutyunyan did not, however, say whether there were any concrete plans for a potential expansion."

The Aljazeera reports:

"Harutyunyan also dismissed calls from opposition politicians for the creation of a second Russian base in Armenia’s southern Syunik region, wedged between Azerbaijan and the Azeri exclave of Nakhchivan."

According to the Aljazeera's report:

"Harutyunyan said he saw no need for Russia to formally open a second military base, but added the two countries were considering deploying a military unit from the existing base to eastern Armenia, near the border with Azerbaijan."


******


The 23 July 2020 issue The Moscow Times published an article entitled "Can Russia Mediate New Clashes Between Armenia and Azerbaijan?" written by Sergei Markedonov.

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


*** This article was first published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.


Sergei Markedonov writes:

"Moscow and Baku also cooperate in many areas, from cross-border security and energy to the use of Caspian resources and transport projects."

The author addresses:

"The Kremlin does not want to see Azerbaijan turn into another Georgia, and so does not intend to push Baku onto the path of confrontation."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


*** This article was first published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.


According to Markedonov:

"If Azerbaijan’s leadership itself chooses to turn its back on Russia and pursue a path of Euro-Atlantic solidarity, then Moscow’s position will of course become far less cautious and nuanced."

The writer points out:

"But until that happens, Russia will strive to perform a balancing act between Yerevan and Baku."

The author addresses:

"It was Moscow that brokered a ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in May 1994, and put an end to the Four-Day War in April 2016."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


*** This article was first published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.


Mr. Markedonov explains:

"It’s likely that this time, too, it’s Russia that will get the two sides back to the negotiating table."

The writer states:

"Unlike in Abkhazia or the Donbas, Russia’s role in this conflict is viewed positively by both the United States and the EU, not to mention the two sides in the conflict."

Mr. Markedonov points out:

"For Moscow, it’s not worth risking that capital just for another opportunity to demonstrate its strength, though that though that option can’t be ruled out altogether, especially as a response to attempts by other world powers to disrupt the status quo to force Russia out of the region."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


*** This article was first published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.


The writer explains:

"But as long as that doesn’t happen, Moscow will continue to combine several seemingly irreconcilable things:

a union with Armenia, a partnership with Azerbaijan, and mediation in the long-running Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict."

The author addresses:

"This state of affairs doesn’t suit either Baku or Yerevan entirely, of course."

Mr. Markedonov notes:

"But for Moscow, making a definitive choice in favor of either side would drastically reduce its room for maneuver."

According to him:

"In any case, Russia understands perfectly that it’s down to the two sides to search for compromises."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


The author writes:

"They may not be prepared to do so, but no one else is going to do that work for them."

Mr. Markedonov adds:

"Still, there are plenty of tasks that it is fully within Russia’s power to solve, such as neutralizing the consequences of potential escalation, and maintaining the basis for, if not substantive talks, then at least managing the conflict to prevent it from unfreezing irrevocably."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


The writer explains:

"For Moscow, all other options regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan run the risk of sharply polarizing the Caucasus, which could stir up other powers there — from Turkey to the United States and the EU — and cause Russia to lose its status as an unbiased broker in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution."

The author points out:

"In addition, Russia picking a side in the conflict would be dangerous for Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it would mean a breakdown in relations with Moscow for the other side."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


Mr. Maredonov explains:

"As a result, Nagorno-Karabakh would go from being a unique place where Russia and the West cooperate, despite their global confrontation, to yet another theater for their rivalry, with all the ensuing risks and dangers."

Source:

Can
Russia
Mediate
New
Clashes
Between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan?


*** This article was first published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.








24
February
2021:
"Alexander's
creator
SPOKE:
Pashinyan
doesn't
know
what
he's
talking
about



By
Tim
Newmanon
(December
15,
2015)Putin's
unusual
walk:
KGB
or
Parkinson's?



Carl
Schreck
(May
08,
2016)
:Blood
Sport:
The
Rise
Of
Russia's
Gangster
Athletes



By
Peter
Hobson
(May 12,
2016):
"How
Europe
Became
a
Russian
Gangster
Playground."



September
7,
2020
by tbca:
Indictment
of
“Troika”
(Tambovskaya
gang)
case
and
Gennady
Petrov
in
Spain,
May
2015



Putin's
List





Dundee
Bugene:
Azerbaycan
Ermenistan
Sorunu



Ramil (Feb 8,
2021):
Let
them
come
and
catch
me!"
-
Flora
Karimova



Ramil (Feb 8,
2021):
Putin
warns Pashinyan:
"Armenia
is
in
a
new
game"






























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